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Inside the Matrix: Imperfections in Introspection 
Jonathan Riedel, 2009 
 
 This paper was written for a class entitled Philosophy of Psychology.  The main 
objective of the class is to tackle the question of what to do when neuroscientific evidence 
conflicts with what ordinary people report of their experience.  What happens when the 
personal explanation is at odds with the subpersonal?  One such manifestation of the 
conflict, dubbed “the interface dilemma,” is introspection: what one reports about their 
feelings and beliefs, barring a motivation to lie, seems incorrigible.  No one can tell me I am 
wrong when I say I am sad because the only access to that knowledge is through 
introspection, my private and personal experience. 
 When I mention terms like “autonomist” and “neuro-computationalist,” I am 
referring to the different schools of thought about this issue.  Autonomists, on one end of 
the spectrum, believe that the accuracy of first-person reports is inviolable.  For them, 
when I say I am in love and my brain patterns don't match up to what everyone else's do 
when they are in love, 'love' has to be redefined in the neuroscientist's dictionary, not in 
people's ordinary usage; people trump science.  On the other end of the spectrum are the 
neuro-computationalists (or the eliminativists), who believe that progressive scientific 
discoveries will eventually tell us what we need to know about the brain, such that 
currently ambiguous matters about thoughts, beliefs, and qualitative experience will have a 
clear definition, much the way that the “folk” notion of the four humors was eventually 
put to rest by the discovery of microbes as the primary cause of illness.  More moderate 
views exist, but in this context the battle between extreme views is the major concern. 
 Philosophy of Psychology, and in particular the question of whether 
introspection is reliable, is very important for how we live our daily lives.  Should we 
trust a scientific report more than a person telling to our faces the details of his or her 
experience?  A serious challenge to introspection, something we take to be so basic to our 
understanding of ourselves and the world, is definitely a matter worth discussing, and I 
hope my advocacy of Nisbett and Wilson will allow us to hold on to that faculty while 
taking into consideration the undoubtedly auspicious progress of science. 
 
 
 
What if The Matrix were real?  It 
is certainly provocative to entertain the 
thought that we are living in a world that 
we think to be real but is actually not.  
Despite its intrigue, the sane of us 
generally regard the film’s premise as 
false.  There is no way that we can be 
wrong about something so simple as that 
which is right in front of our noses at all 
times, and it is even more menacing to 
think that even our own mental states are 
subject to inaccuracy – right?  Sadly, 
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scientific studies lead to theories 
presented by Gopnik, Gordon, and 
Nisbett and Wilson that we are in a kind 
of prison of the mind, where 
introspection is a flawed means of 
accessing the truth about mental states.  
Of these particular theorists, however, 
Nisbett and Wilson present the most 
clear-cut challenge to introspection 
without leaving us in absolute skepticism 
like Gopnik and Gordon do.  While all of 
the above would agree that what we 
assume to be introspection is imperfect, 
Nisbett and Wilson argue not to the 
effect that introspection itself is wrong, 
but that our conception of it is often 
mistaken.  Instead, the explanation of 
behavior resides in a priori causal 
relationships.  So, while Gopnik and 
Gordon take blows at the foundations of 
epistemology, the latter pair presents a 
serious challenge to introspection 
without destroying all talk about the 
interface dilemma and knowledge in 
general. 
 The discussion of behavior 
explanations begins with simple 
psychological experiments.  For example, 
the answer to “how did you recall your 
mother’s maiden name?” is usually along 
the lines of “I don’t know, it just came 
to me.”  Such an inarticulate answer for 
this and for similar questions suggests 
that perceptual and memorial processes 
have a nebulous underlying structure; 
perhaps our inability to explain the 
“higher-order processes” for recalling 
such facts means that introspection is 
not a good means of identifying our 
mental states.  This anti-introspectivist 
view seems problematic for a few 
reasons, according to Nisbett and 
Wilson: (1) Inarticulate explanations 
about perception and memory do not 
guarantee that all higher-order processing 
is chaos; (2) Even though questions 
about recall maybe answered poorly, 
people generally know how to 
articulately answer other kinds of 
questions like “why they behaved as 
they did in some social situation or why 
they like or dislike an object or another 
person”1; (3) Since introspection is 
utterly and completely wrong, people 
can never be correct about their mental 
states, a highly troubling assertion if 
certain states are only accessible by this 
means. 
 The basis of Nisbett and 
Wilson’s overall argument is the 
challenge of these seeming problems.  
The writers claim that: (1’) Some 
connections between stimuli and effects 
which are clearly affecting an experiment 
go unnoticed by subjects, meaning that 
“the accuracy of subjective reports is so 
poor as to suggest that any introspective 
access that may exist is not sufficient to 
produce generally correct or reliable 
reports”2; (2’) Not just questions about 
recalling maiden names are subject to 
confusion – even explanations of 
preference or acting in social situations 
may not be given as a result of 
introspection but what is wrongly 
assumed to be introspection; (3’) People 
can be correct, but usually they are 
correct accidentally.  In the most 
powerful blow to knowledge via 
introspection, (2’), Nisbett and Wilson 
                                                
1  Nisbett, Richard, and Timothy 
DeCamp Wilson, “Telling More Than We Can 
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes”, 
Psychological Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (May 
1977): 232. 
2  Ibid., 233. 
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note that people who claim to introspect 
on reasons for an effect are often in fact 
using “implicit, a priori theories about 
the causal connection between stimulus 
and response.”3  In (3’), they assert that 
people are correct when what would be 
true as determined by introspection is 
also true as determined by using the 
aforementioned sub-personal knowledge 
of cause and effect relationships.  Such 
accuracy usually occurs when the given 
information is limited and explicit.4 
 Why, now, should we believe 
that we are not good at introspecting?  
Like Gopnik, Nisbett and Wilson show 
substantial evidence from a plethora of 
experiments that (1’) is true.  Nisbett’s 
own data on shock subjects, who 
performed differently depending on 
whether they had taken a placebo, 
suggests that deeper cognitive processes 
affect subjects’ behavior – in this case, 
tolerance of pain – while their own 
explanations of their behavior report 
otherwise.  The subjects claim that they 
were not thinking about the pill at all, 
but their behavior suggests that at an 
unconscious5 level they were using 
knowledge of having taken a pill.  If the 
implications of such experiments are 
correct, then it is clear that subjects 
“cannot report on the existence of 
influential stimuli.  It therefore would be 
quite impossible for them to describe 
accurately the role played by these 
stimuli in influencing their responses.”6  
                                                
3  Ibid. 
4  See p. 253, When Will We Be Correct 
In Our Verbal Reports? 
5  I am using the term “unconscious” 
literally, i.e. the subjects themselves did not 
recognize the possibility that they were behaving 
based on having taken the pill. 
6  Ibid., 240. 
Thus, this first facet of their argument is 
quite compelling. 
 Their second and third premises 
deal with statements of the sort, “I came 
to a stop because the light started to 
change” and “I played a trump because I 
had no cards in the suit that was led.”7  
Because the explanation (the part of the 
sentence after the word “because”) is 
recalled from memory based on the 
questions “why did you come to stop?” 
and “why did you play a trump?”, it 
feels like a definite result of introspective 
access.  One looks for the answer in 
some history of mental states and gives 
an explanation based on what his or her 
state was that seemed to produce the 
effect.  Nisbett and Wilson, however, 
assert that the explanations are not 
actually given via introspection.  Rather, 
our knowledge of pre-existing causal 
relationships override whatever we 
understand to be introspection: “the 
culture or a subculture may have explicit 
rules stating the relationship between a 
particular stimulus and a particular 
response.”8  What is perceived as the 
cause of one’s behavior is actually 
already set.  While it is true that I come 
to a stop because the light started to 
change, I know that I do this because the 
relationship between my stopping a car 
and my seeing a yellow light is already 
established, and I base my explanations 
off this relationship. 
 This position, in my view, is 
convincing because it provides relief 
from the injustice of a five year-old's 
favorite game: asking perpetual “why” 
questions.  The existence of a priori 
                                                
7  Ibid., 248. 
8  Ibid. 
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causal theories means a rest from ad 
infinitum interrogation of the form: 
 -“Why did you stop?”  -
“Because the light started to change.” 
 -“Why did the light’s changing 
make you stop?” -“Because the law says 
I should stop.” 
 -“Why does the law’s saying so 
motivate you to stop?”  -Etc. 
In the direct introspective way of 
evaluating behavior, there is never really 
an end to why one acts the way one acts.  
If (2’) and (3’) are true, one knows the 
way one acts is based on causal 
relationships, and the explanation stops 
there.  Although it may feel like 
introspection because the information is 
retrieved internally, it is not.  What 
actually counts as introspection, then, is 
an independent issue.  Nisbett and 
Wilson’s argument allows for 
introspection to still be valid, but that 
our distinction between using 
introspection and using a priori theories 
is wrong.  Such a claim is ultimately and 
auspiciously benign. 
 Furthermore, the argument from 
Nisbett and Wilson lacks nothing in 
seriousness, despite its acceptable 
implications.  Like Gopnik and Gordon, 
they still challenge an individual’s ability 
to introspect, but the result is not 
threatening to the idea of knowing the 
reasons for one’s behavior.  In the other 
authors’ views, it seems that anything 
we say about explanations for actions is 
wrong if it comes about internally.  
Gopnik extrapolates her theory to the 
broadest degree, questioning whether 
correct introspection for anyone is even 
comprehensible.  If young children think 
they are right but are actually so clearly 
wrong, how do adults know that they are 
not wrong?  In Gopnik’s world, perhaps 
we are living in the matrix. Gordon’s idea 
of an egocentric shift is implausible for 
reasons too expansive to be discussed 
here. 
 Nisbett and Wilson, however, do 
not say that all introspection is wrong, 
simply that what we think to be 
introspective access is in fact something 
else.  The division between what “feels 
like introspection” and “introspection 
itself” is existent but its boundaries are 
nebulous.  Since they assume that 
theory-laden belief production is far 
more prevalent than actual introspection, 
they still assert that introspective access 
is not as easy and accurate as one might 
think.  When we try to explain our 
behavior and get inarticulate results in 
some cases – “it just felt like it”, “it just 
came to me” – or articulate results in 
others – “I played a trump card 
because...” – we realize that we still can 
be right but are often not.9  The 
conditions under which we are correct 
“accidentally” are too elaborate to 
discuss here (see footnote 4). 
 As a serious challenge to the 
existence of direct access to mental 
states, Nisbett and Wilson’s theory has 
dramatic implications for the interface 
problem.  Autonomy theorists seem to 
come out on top; if sub-personal 
explanations (e.g. those discovered via 
introspection) are flawed, then the 
autonomists lose nothing in attributing 
full autonomy to person-level 
explanations.  Furthermore, Nisbett and 
Wilson’s idea that what we take to be 
introspection is actually a subtle recall of 
a priori causal theories supports 
                                                
9  (3’) covers this possibilty. 
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autonomy theory because then person-
level relations are, at the core, the means 
to accessing mental states.  The idea that 
personal and sub-personal explanations 
have no questions in common to answer 
is perfectly commensurable with Nisbett 
and Wilson’s theory.  Predictably, the 
neuro-computationalist loses one battle 
even though the personal-sub-personal 
distinction is conspicuously sharpened.  
That certain kind of sub-personal 
explanation which we rely on so heavily 
to be accurate is indeed flawed.  
However, the neuro-computationalist 
also wins a battle: if people are unaware 
of their reliance on a priori causal 
theories in almost 100% of cases – i.e. 
people wrongly believe they are 
introspecting – then commonsense 
psychology is in trouble. 
 In the full-blown war, autonomy 
theory can be said to win.  Even Nisbett 
and Wilson themselves speak out against 
the stubborn reclusiveness of neuro-
computational eliminativism.  Even if it 
feels like introspection is “nothing more 
than judgments of plausibility”, they 
argue, there are other factors that make it 
unfair to discredit all introspective 
reports and ignore all arguments based on 
them.10  Autonomy theorists would 
probably support the use of 
introspection, as long as it avoided 
affecting person-level characteristics, 
while the eliminativists would ignore one 
side altogether. 
 Independent from its effects on 
the interface dilemma, the challenge of 
Nisbett and Wilson that introspection is 
not exactly what we thought it was is 
nothing to turn a nose up at.  In fact, the 
                                                
10  Ibid., 255. 
reason the challenge is so compelling is 
because it can exist without questioning 
all access to knowledge.  If explanations 
of our behavior rely on pre-existing cause 
and effect relationships, so what?  We 
would certainly like to believe we are 
right when we internally access a mental 
state, but if we are not correct, there 
does not seem to be any harm done.  The 
damage may be done to our egos, but at 
least there is a way to make sure we are 
not part of the matrix. 
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